INTRODUCTION
It is now 15 years since the negotiations on climate change formally commenced in 1990.
1 Two years of negotiations led to the adoption of a comprehensive multilateral framework agreement on climate change -the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) -in 1992.
2 Two years later, the convention entered into force and paved the way for negotiations to begin on a follow-up protocol. Three years after that, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, which includes targets for industrialized countries and a number of flexible mechanisms for the implementation of these commitments. 3 Eight years later, in February 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. All of these developments point to a rather successful legal regime that has moved incrementally forward and -compared to other complex multilateral environmental agreements -has done so rather quickly.
Yet, the withdrawal of the USA from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 has cast a damper on the progress made within the regime and has affected its momentum. 4 This has spawned a series of articles in the literature whose authors can broadly be classified into two categories: those who believe that the best way to address a problem as complex and serious as climate change is to widen (include other related issue areas and institutions) 5 and broaden and deepen 6 (develop new policies, mechanisms and follow-up protocols) the climate change regime; and those who believe that climate change is so complex that it would be impossible to have a unified global agenda and that one must instead seek solace in the so-called orchestra of efforts where a number of different regional, national, local and/or sectoral agreements are negotiated by likeminded countries, possibly independent of each other. 7 The most significant difference between these two categories is that the first approach focuses on the climate regime (UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and possible follow-up legal instruments), whereas the latter is characterized by more ad hoc agreements between countries at a regional or sectoral level, or even agreements between public and private parties, all not necessarily under the auspices of a single climate regime.
The starting point of this article is that these two paths are not incompatible and that there is, thus, no need to dichotomize between them. Instead, one can reconcile both approaches by arguing that they may be mutually supportive and that policy options can be explored both within a multilateral framework and outside of it. In fact, almost none of the mentioned proposals on a future climate regime suggest rejecting the multilateral framework completely. On the contrary, most proposals suggest either a role for the UNFCCC as a facilitator for other approaches 8 or envisage a return to this framework in due time. 9 This indicates that the second approach does not necessarily exclude multilateralism.
This article identifies a range of policy and legal instruments and measures to help the global effort to address the climate change problem, and specifies whether such measures can be adopted as a direct follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol or whether such measures will require other parties to engage in the debate and adopt regional, sectoral or public/private agreements. The focus is less on broadening and deepening the climate change agenda, which has been explored elsewhere in the literature, 10 but rather on how one can widen the climate change agenda through new and innovative policy and legal measures, in particular through the utilization of interlinkages of existing material, and the strengthening and promotion of new institutional interlinkages.
The article proceeds as follows. First, the nature of climate change as a political problem will be sketched out and issue linkages (broad, overarching relationships between different issue areas, such as between biodiversity and climate) that are used in the analysis will be conceptualized and defined. Key material and institutional linkages will be examined with a set of other policies, namely poverty alleviation, land use, energy, trade and investment, air pollution, health, maritime and air transport, human settlements, freshwater, and seas and oceans. The article is then concluded by summing up strategic design options for widening the development of the regime.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The complexity of resolving the climate change problem can be partly ascribed to the fact that climate change is interlinked in both cause and effect with most areas of human activity. Mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change requires measures in many sectors that range from energy and transport to land use and urban development. All of these are inherently linked with the development goals of countries. In short, effective climate policy is tantamount to effective sustainable development policy.
Sustainable development, however, is too complex an issue to be addressed within one institutional arrangement. 11 In the past decades, therefore, a large number of separate, yet frequently overlapping, treaties and other legal instruments related to sustainable development and environmental protection have been agreed at the international level.
12 Most of these have been negotiated in a single-issue area in order to keep the issues manageable and politically feasible, and to make use of windows of opportunity within the existing global power and interest configurations that allow countries to cooperate on individual issues.
13 As a result, many agreements in the international arena regulate activities of countries on a number of smallissue areas.
14 This is not just an empirical observation, but also a recommendation by several political scientists. 15 Successful regime formation often depends upon the problem being simple, benign and limited.
At the same time, however, linking issues can create new windows of opportunity to synchronize separate regimes and to win support from more countries in a gradual effort to make progress in sustainable development. 16 Such linkages may compensate reluctant countries by serving as side payments and, thus, help promote favourable outcomes in other fields. 17 This idea received an additional impetus from the process of rationalizing and reorganizing the work undertaken within the UN since 1992 to focus on increasing the efficiency of the UN system and remove internal contradictions. 18 Also, links between issues can help to raise climate change on the agendas of governments and to exploit potential co-benefits and no-regrets options. 19 For example, if the climate problem is framed in terms of water or energy policy, then governments may also take actions in those areas that they otherwise may not have been motivated to do if the issue had been framed only as an abstract and long-term threat.
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The analysis below will focus on material and institutional interlinkages. Material (or functional or factual) linkages are inherent structural connections between policy domains that are largely independent of the rules and procedures of political institutions in the domain. Examples are the effects of deforestation on global warming, or vice versa, and the negative impacts of global warming on agriculture in many regions. Institutional and organizational linkages are connections between societal institutions, for example between the norm-setting process of the climate regime and the norm-setting process of the biodiversity regime, as well as linkages between different organizations, for example between different international organizations active on environmental issues. Additional possible linkages between issues not discussed in this article include political (or bargaining) linkages that result from the strategies of countries or negotiation facilitators who are able to link issues in order to generate larger bargains, 21 and normative interlinkages that result from situations when one regime confirms or contradicts the norms upheld by another institution and, thus, affects its normative compliance pull or the normative force of international law.
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With material linkages, it is possible to study the potential for enhancing collaboration between two issue areas because of their interconnectedness. With institutional linkages, it is possible to study different institutions, treaties and organizations with a view to examining whether they are compatible, synergetic, incompatible or contradictory. Studying these links helps to identify ways in which the combined impacts of institutions and organizations can be enhanced.
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MATERIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES
This section reviews material and institutional interlinkages of the climate regime with a number of other issue areas. In each subsection, the material and institutional interlinkages are sketched out, and then proposals for potential additional institutional interlinkages that could be promoted and agreed upon by governments are outlined.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND POVERTY
Since the climate regime includes both rich and poor countries, any attempt to engage developing countries will have to take some of their specific priorities into account, including the need to reduce poverty. 24 In addition, there is also a material relationship with poverty alleviation. On the one hand, climate change will have disproportionate, adverse impacts on the poor and is a cause of poverty -in particular the lack of capacity to adapt to climate change impacts. 25 On the other hand, countries that have to deal with the immediate pressing needs of poverty alleviation are unlikely to prioritize an abstract and less immediate problem such as climate change. 26 Poverty alleviation itself implies increased consumption and possibly production and, hence, an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, poverty can affect the ability of a community to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
27 Poverty can be caused by micro-level factors, such as those related to the individual and to households; by meso-level factors, such as those related to communities, production sectors, product and market factors; by macro-factors such as those related to monetary policy, fiscal policy and governance issues; and by international factors, such as those related to trade policy, international debt and monetary policy. 28 An effective international climate change strategy would, thus, try to find ways to link up with the poverty policies undertaken at the global level and mainstream climate change concerns within them. This would primarily have to be achieved through influencing foreign aid and development bank (such as the World Bank) policies in such a way that, in addition to reducing poverty, vulnerability to climatic change is reduced. In addition, mainstreaming climate change policy in national sectoral policies is essential in helping developing countries to integrate adaptation into their planning processes. Developing small-scale renewable energy programmes in rural areas could also address the need to both reduce poverty and mitigate climate change. Such programmes are being developed in South Africa and India. They should be affordable and sustainable, as well as integrated into rural development programmes.
29
CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND USE AND BIODIVERSITY
Another critical issue linkage is the link between climate change and land use. The way that land is used, in particular for agriculture and forestry, has implications for greenhouse gas emissions, and climate impacts themselves may affect land use in the future. For example, wet rice cultivation emits methane, while certain soil types and forests absorb greenhouse gases in the stages in which they grow and, hence, form carbon sinks or reservoirs. However, ecosystems that are prone to desertification may lose this function and may contribute to climate change. 30 Wetlands (in particular peatlands) also form reservoirs for carbon, but are very sensitive to changes in the climate and related changes, including sea-level rise. forest policy in the form of the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF), 37 and the CBD remains important in this field. Additionally, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has a number of initiatives that link food security and agricultural issues to climate change. 38 The objectives of the regimes on climate change, desertification, forests, biodiversity and wetlands are synergetic. 39 However, the cost-effectiveness principle of the climate regime could imply that the ecological dimensions of climate policies are not respected fully.
40 This is most apparent with regard to the rules on sinks. For example, although the Kyoto Protocol calls for the promotion of sustainable forest management, 41 activities enhancing sinks can both be synergetic or conflicting with the goal of forest conservation. Conflicts may occur if governments seek to achieve their climate goals through cost-effective afforestation or re-forestation projects that involve creating fastgrowing monoculture forest plantations that reduce biodiversity. 42 On the other hand, there is potential for synergies, if sustainable forest management is promoted. 43 In a similar vein, if the use of land for carbon sequestration leads to the conversion of wetlands, this will contradict the objectives of the Ramsar Convention. 44 Efforts that explicitly address the interactions between climate change and land use and biodiversity are underway. In 2001, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests was established to promote cooperation and coordination on forestry issues (including on the importance of forests for climate change), with the UNFCCC, CBD and UNCCD included in the partnership. 45 Furthermore, convention secretariats have observer status in each other's regimes, and the secretariats of the Rio conventions (UNFCCC, CBD and UNCCD) have set up a joint liaison group (JLG) to promote cooperation, exchange information on plans and enhance cohesion at the international, as well as the national level. 46 The FAO is already an observer in the climate negotiations. Additionally, steps have been undertaken to address interlinkages between the Rio conventions and the UNFF with regard to forest landscape restoration at the national level. 47 In order to enhance synergies and reduce conflicts between the various regimes, there are a number of key policy options, including developing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 39 See, for example, the Preamble to the UNCCD, n. 34 above, which acknowledges this potential for synergy. Also, the UNFCCC, n. 2 above, calls on parties to 'cooperate in the conservation and enhancement . . . of . . . biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems' (Article 4(1)(d)), and to develop and elaborate 'appropriate and integrated plans . . . for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification' (Article 4(1)(e)). 40 The UNFCCC, ibid., Article 3(3), dealing with the precautionary principle, states that 'lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing . . . measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost' (emphasis added). This requirement thus limits States in taking certain precautionary measures. See F. Yamin and J. Depledge, n. 5 above, at 71. D. Bodansky, n. 1 above, at 503, notes however that this formulation is already less stringent than that of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which requires the measures themselves to be cost effective, rather than taking this into account. 41 See Kyoto Protocol, n. 3 above, Article 2(1)(a)(ii). UNFCCC Secretariats. 48 Another option would be to promote the use of renewable energy (such as solar energy) in rural areas, through financial incentives within the climate regime and through other options such as development aid from the multilateral development banks, thereby reducing the pressure to cut firewood. A third option includes promoting specific measures within the climate regime, such as limiting the generation of carbon credits from converted wetlands, and instead promoting the protection of such wetlands and protecting fragile ecosystems by zoning procedures, introducing the concept of integrated multi-functional land use, and synchronizing the provision of land subsidies and other incentives to allow for multi-functional land use. National workshops, in which the implementation of the different treaties is linked, could help to identify context-specific bottlenecks and synergies.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY
Climate change is closely linked to energy. Most energy is developed through the exploitation of fossil fuels and, thus, leads directly or indirectly to the emissions of greenhouse gases. This is also a political strategic link, since energy is a top priority of most governments, even if climate change is not. 49 At the international level, the institutional context is, in the first place, provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which focuses on energy issues of developed countries and which examines global energy issues, 50 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which aims to 'accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'. 51 In addition, the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, signed and ratified by mainly European countries, aims to 'promote long-term cooperation in the energy field' by regulating energy investment, trade and the transit of energy. 52 56 but otherwise remain quite general on energy issues. Energy sources with low (or no) greenhouse gas emissions are primarily promoted through the IAEA, as well as the various agreements on hydrogen research. However, nuclear energy has other serious environmental and security impacts, and hydrogen is not yet a tried and tested energy carrier.
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The potential synergy between climate and energy policy could be exploited further through, perhaps, the development of an international partnership on sustainable energy policy, which may include representatives from countries engaging in international energy initiatives from the climate change regime, as well as fossil fuel exporters. The purpose of such a partnership would be to discuss energy issues in a comprehensive manner so that dams, hydrogen, nuclear energy and fossil fuels are discussed in one forum. Another option is negotiating a protocol to the UNFCCC, promoting the increased use of renewable energy, or a protocol on research and development of energy technologies. Finally, the development and promotion of sectoral 48 56 See UNFCCC, n. 2 above, Article 4(1)(c); and Kyoto Protocol, n. 3 above, Article 10(c). 57 See F. Sindico and J. Gupta, n. 49 above, at 178. agreements between major energy-producing companies and between major energy-consuming sectors could result in reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a bottom-up manner.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE AND FINANCE
Climate change is also intricately linked to trade and finance. Climate change is affected by international trade as trade potentially increases economic activities, which can lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, taking measures to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions in specific countries might adversely affect their competitiveness and, hence, reduce their willingness to participate in such measures. 58 The substantive link between climate and international finance and investment is that investment regimes and development banks have often invested in projects that have high greenhouse gas emissions, leading to potential conflicts. 59 Many have also argued that the climate regime is, in effect, an investment regime.
60
The international institutional context consists primarily of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 61 a range of regional and bilateral trade agreements, 62 more than 2000 bilateral and regional investment treaties, multilateral development banks and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
The objectives and principles of the trade and climate regimes are prima facie compatible. The WTO Agreement, for example, notes the objective of sustainable development in its Preamble. 63 In addition, both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol specifically aim to ensure compatibility with the trade regime. 64 Furthermore, the World Bank and the GEF have incorporated the objectives of the climate regime in their policies. However, in the area of investment, some investment agreements prohibit the kind of conditioning of investments that the Kyoto mechanisms promote.
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A potential normative conflict with regard to the GEF is the question of who has the final say in project funding and general decisions. In case of conflicts, the GEF could ultimately be held accountable by the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC. 66 However, apart from some minor problems related to GEF procedures, and the fact that the GEF has systematically postponed financing major adaptation projects, serious conflicts between the GEF and the UNFCCC have not yet occurred.
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The linkages between climate, trade and finance are, to some extent, already addressed in international fora. . On the impacts of development banks on the environment see, for example, P. Sands, n. 12 above, at 1026. 60 In particular, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is intended to stimulate investment flows from developed to developing countries in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See J. Werksman et al., ibid., at 59. The CDM, established by the Kyoto Protocol, allows non-Annex I (developing country) parties to access additional resources from Annex I (developed country) parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (certified emission reductionsCERs) from proposed or existing projects. Annex I parties can use the CERs accruing from these projects to achieve their targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 64 See UNFCCC, n. 2 above, Article 3(5), which states that '[t]he parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all parties . . . Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade'. See also Kyoto Protocol, n. 3 above, Article 2(3), which states that '[t]he parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures . . . in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the . . . effects on international trade'. 65 See, in general, J. Werksman et al., n. 59 above. 66 See P. Sands, n. 12 above, at 1036. 67 See S. Oberthür, The International Regime on Climate Change (Ecologic, 2001), at 16, who notes that there is room for improvement with regard to the efficiency and responsiveness of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) procedures. In addition, developing countries continue to voice criticisms regarding the GEF, which is often perceived, despite its reform in 1994, as being not fully responsive to southern needs and interests.
status in the meetings of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, 68 and the World Bank and GEF have observer status at the climate COPs. An MoU, specifying the role and responsibilities of both the UNFCCC COP and the GEF, was adopted at the second UNFCCC COP (COP-2) in 1996. 69 The MoU states, inter alia, that the climate COP will 'decide on policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the convention for the financial mechanism which shall function under the guidance of and be accountable to the COP'.
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Since the WTO does not specifically require that its members need to take the climate change issue into account, it might make sense to establish a joint WTO/UNFCCC working group to ensure that potential conflicts between the two regimes are addressed. 71 However, given the fundamental conflict of ideology and interests between the two regimes in that the WTO promotes free trade, which should stimulate cheap production processes, and the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol promote sustainable production processes, the strong institutional framework, history and pedigree of the WTO, the differences in some critical parties to both agreements (notably that the USA and Australia are members of the WTO but have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol), and the different ministries engaged in negotiating the two issues, an MoU would perhaps be more appropriate. 72 Additionally, 'grand bargaining' could be used to make significant trade-offs in the fields of trade and climate.
Potential conflicts with investment regimes that aim to protect the interests of foreign investors can be avoided by the development and adoption of an international sustainable investment agreement.
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It may also be necessary to mainstream climate change into investment policies. Since countries do not normally control foreign investment, host countries could develop a number of guidelines for foreign investors.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND AIR POLLUTION
Climate change is also closely linked with other environmental issues, such as (local) air pollution and the depletion of the ozone layer. First, many substances that deplete the ozone layer and many of their substitutes (notably hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)) are greenhouse gases. Hence, eliminating ozone-depleting substances generally creates synergies with abating climate change; but can also create conflicts with climate protection if the wrong alternative substances or processes are supported. 74 Second, other air pollutants and greenhouse gases often have common sources, interact with each other in the atmosphere and, separately or jointly, cause a variety of environmental effects. 79 Technically, sulphur dioxide emissions can have a temporary cooling effect in the atmosphere. This can mask the warming effect of climate change. While some may argue that this is a negative linkage between the two regimes, the position here is taken that sulphur emissions cause acid rain and, hence, are a serious environmental problem. In any event, the cooling effect is temporary. Hence, there is no real conflict between the air pollution regime and climate change on this issue. different secretariats are observers in the negotiations in each other's regimes. Research cooperation between the scientific bodies of the climate and ozone regimes has also been initiated. 80 There is potential for synergies between the financial mechanism of the Montreal Protocol and the UNFCCC, but only if the goals of the two treaties are explicitly synchronized. 81 The UNFCCC explicitly focuses on greenhouse gases not covered by the Montreal Protocol; 82 however, the Montreal Protocol should ensure that it does not introduce ozone-depleting substances that are greenhouse gases.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND OTHER ISSUE AREAS
Climate change also has links with a number of other issue areas. These include health, international transport, human settlements, freshwater, and the oceans and seas.
Changes in weather and climate can both directly affect human lives through heat and cold waves, but also indirectly through the spread of disease-carrying bacteria and viruses. Mainstreaming climate change impacts and adapting them into the work of the World Health Organization (WHO) may be one way to minimize the adverse effects of climate change on health and goes a step beyond current activities that include reports from the WHO to the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.
The emissions given out by ships and aircrafts are presently not attributed to countries and are regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Although cooperation with these organizations has been on the UNFCCC agenda for a long time, little progress has been made. 83 A common policymaking forum between the three organizations could enhance the effectiveness of policy making. Furthermore, threats of regulation of emissions from ships and aircrafts, or unilateral action by individual countries or the EU to reduce emissions, could improve the situation. 84 The UN Centre for Human Settlements (UN HABITAT) promotes sustainable housing and urban governance. There is considerable potential for linking the climate change mitigation and adaptation agenda to the work of this body, for example into HABITAT's Disaster Management Programme. This UN body could help the UNFCCC explore options that could bypass central governments and go directly to city governments to address climate change issues.
Climate change is likely seriously to affect the hydrological cycle and these changes, in turn, can affect the climate. Although it is not yet in force, freshwater issues will be primarily regulated by the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, 85 as well as several regional and bilateral agreements. Many of these regimes may need to re-examine the issue of water allocation to see how they can adopt more relevant responses to the impact of climate change on freshwater. Similarly, national governments may need to check whether they have taken into account the impacts of climate change on their water supply and hydropower facilities. Oceans and seas are primarily governed by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 86 and several regional seas agreements. Possible cooperation with these bodies could ensure that all the new options being explored -such as deep-sea carbon storageare also taken into account.
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CONCLUSIONS
This analysis of ways of widening the climate change regime by using issue linkages reveals a number of potential ways to breathe new life into the process. Some are already being explored by the secretariats of various regimes; some still need to be further developed.
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that policies to widen the agenda can be classified into four types of measures.
The first type of measures includes those that are needed to align activities in the climate regime with activities in related regimes. This means that parties to the UNFCCC may need to explore the option of developing new MoUs with other UN agencies and bodies. Such MoUs could be established with the GEF (especially with respect to the implementation of the different funding mechanisms), ICAO and IMO, the development banks and the WTO. The politics and economics of these bodies is so complicated that only a high-level agreement may provide the political momentum and the legal mandate to these bodies to explore avenues for cooperation. Where the politics is less charged, there might be room for cooperation at the level of the bureaucracies, that is, the respective secretariats of the existing conventions and organizations. While such cooperation is feasible, actually merging these secretariats to enhance the efficiency of the system will be hard to achieve, as there is fierce competition between host countries. 88 With regard to land use, a first step would be inviting Ramsar to join as a full member of the JLG between the UNCCD, CBD and the UNFCCC. The development of a joint working group and/or an international partnership on sustainable energy policy could also help to ensure that conflicts with regard to energy issues are signalled early and that possible synergies are explored.
The second type of measures includes those that can be taken either within the climate regime or outside as part of bilateral, multilateral, regional or sectoral agreements. These include the development of protocols encouraging governments to adopt targets for the development of renewable energy, on research and development of energy technologies, and on transnational sectoral targets for highly internationalized sectors to promote technological development. Additionally, national workshops to integrate land-use concerns relating to desertification, deforestation and development with climate change could form a useful method to explore synergies at the national level.
The third type of measures includes those that could be taken exclusively outside the climate regime. These include mainstreaming climate change policy at the international and national level, within the policies of the FAO, UN HABITAT and the development banks, as well as in foreign investment policy (in the form of guidelines for foreign investors). Specific measures include the need for negotiating a possible multilateral sustainable investment agreement.
The fourth type concerns policy measures needed exclusively within the climate regime in follow-up agreements or as decisions of the UNFCCC COP. These include the development of simple rules for funding adaptation strategies in cooperation with the aid agencies; improving the design of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 89 to pre-empt investment disputes; developing measures within the CDM to ensure that it cannot be misused through, inter alia, providing credits for previously converted wetlands, promote zoning to protect fragile ecosystems (that can also help to reduce vulnerability of local communities), and developing and promoting the concept of multi-functional land use. It might also be appropriate to either amend the existing UNFCCC or add a protocol to deal with other local pollutants, which would also help reduce global warming. A protocol may also be developed to promote cooperation between cities, building on experiences, for example, of UN HABITAT.
These are only some of the possible measures. They may help to buy time in a process where negotiations are flagging on an issue that is increasingly pressing.
